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Focusing upon the five books of his early Hermes series, this article argues that 
Michel Serres furnishes an accomplished, unconventional philosophical account 
of communication and mediation – a structuralist epistemology designed to 
comprehend the sciences in their complexity and plurality – that, even decades 
after its first publication, has significant value for media theory. Two key themes 
within this pentalogy are highlighted: firstly, its emphasis upon motifs of 
communication, transport, and circulation, attempting to grasp the scientific 
field in topological terms, as a kind of networked encyclopaedia; and secondly, 
its attempt to account for the intricate relationship between the formal and the 
empirical in all theorization. 
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The nebulous aggregation of concepts, propositions, and proper names that 
constitutes ‘theory’ as it is typically understood within the humanities departments of 
English-speaking universities is tremendously affected by the chains of transmission 
via which philosophical texts come to be deemed properly ‘theoretical’. 1  These 
processes of importation and propagation are never straightforward, involving 
displacement, distortion, diffusion, and interference. The channel between ‘theory’ and 
its sources is never noiseless. This is particularly noticeable in those strands of theory 
that heavily rely upon resources drawn from continental European traditions (e.g. 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, critical theory, structuralism, philosophy of technics 
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– more recently, in media theory specifically, also media archaeology, cultural 
techniques, etc.), insofar as the stubborn monolingualism of much Anglophone 
scholarship ensures that the theoretical corpus is in large part determined by often 
aleatory patterns of translation and publication.  
When considering the reception of Michel Serres’ oeuvre in relation to this state of 
affairs, and in the context of English-language academia specifically, two things stand 
out to me: first, that the still-untranslated status of his Hermes pentalogy (1968; 1972; 
1974; 1977; 1980) has led to this thoroughgoing philosophical account of 
communication and mediation being largely neglected; and second, that the lack of 
traction gained by French epistemology has meant that the crucial connections 
between Serres’  philosophy and that of Gaston Bachelard are rarely addressed in 
detail.2 I will therefore, in the remainder of this article, attempt to point toward a 
couple of themes and motifs contained within these five books that I would regard as 
potentially valuable for media theory – and in particular, that might help contribute to 
a media theory better able to reckon with its own status as a mediated (and mediating) 
object. 
 
The networked encyclopaedia 
Taking seriously Bachelard’s call for constant methodological innovation – on the basis 
that ‘even the most fecund of methods may eventually become sterile without the 
fertilizing stimulus of new problems to solve’ (1984: 10) – Serres seeks to modify the 
former’s approach, without wholly rejecting it, in order to account for the dramatic 
shifts in contemporary science that had taken place in the intervening decades. Science, 
for Bachelard, ‘is like a half-renovated city, wherein the new (the non-Euclidean, say) 
stands side by side with the old (the Euclidean)’ (1984: 7). The problem in Serres’ view, 
however, is that both of these edifices seem increasingly antiquated. Epistemology must 
keep up with this city’s ongoing renovations: innovations in set theory, topology, 
information theory, genetics, and so forth.3 
Serres aims to articulate a ‘new new scientific spirit  ’(himself acknowledging the 
awkwardness of this expression), which works, on one hand, to buttress many of 
Bachelard’s methodological insights whilst refurbishing them in line with emergent 






scientific theories, and on the other hand, to uncover the Leibnizian encyclopaedism 
and combinatorics which covertly underpins these theories.4 After all, he argues, 
the sciences have managed to arrive at a state described by Leibniz, 
following paths that he blindly planned out: they form, or strive to form, 
a ‘continuous body like an ocean’, which can only be arbitrarily divided 
into the Aethiopian Ocean, the Caledonian Ocean, etc. This continuum is 
the locus of movements and exchanges: methods, models, and results 
circulate all across it, incessantly exported to or imported from all places, 
along routes that are often regulated and sometimes capricious: a network 
or mesh in the ocean (HII: 9-10).5 
The partitions that once divided the encyclopaedia into discrete parts have collapsed, 
revealing in their stead a relativized network of overlapping regions and interwoven 
cross-references, none of which can be firmly established as fixed points or referents 
upon which all others would hinge. The epistemologist becomes a ‘a wandering and 
almost omnipresent subject, granted the status of interceptor: an interceptor of 
communication, of messages circulating through theoretical, global, and 
intersubjective networks’ (HII: 141). 
Bachelard’s ‘philosophy of no’, which strives to be adequate to scientific thought by 
ensuring its openness to new kinds of evidence and new explanations that challenge 
or contradict established ways of thinking, is reconstructed by Serres into ‘a philosophy 
of transport: intersection, intervention, and interception’ (HII: 10), founded upon a 
circulation and multiplication of knowledge freed from all stable references, impossible 
to master from any single point of view.6 The epistemologist finds themselves caught 
indeterminately between two distinct but complementary tasks: to know and to 
circulate, having to either situate themselves within a given region of knowledge, and 
thus remain ignorant of the transport of meaning across regions that is fundamental 
to science, or focus instead upon this process of transport, passing through each of 
these regions at the expense of being able to settle themselves within the stable (if 
provisional) confines of any one. Serres chooses the latter option, noting that in 
recognizing this indeterminism, one is forced to confront the fact that ‘the lucid gaze 
upon the field of knowledge has come up against the same de jure limits as the 
investigative gaze of knowledge upon the world itself’ (HII: 41).  
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Indeed, one of the central themes running throughout the five Hermes books is the 
need for a more methodologically pluralistic conception of the sciences, for which 
there can no longer be any queen-science nor epistemology able to survey the entire 
field from a fixed, objective position. ‘Each science is a science of the sciences, a de 
facto point of view and a de jure point of view looking onto the encyclopaedia’ (HII: 31). 
Each region has its own, native language into which both the world and other forms 
of knowledge are translated, with all the distortion and noise that this inevitably entails. 
The encyclopaedism extolled by Serres is thus in no way comparable with the 
rigorously codified, sectionalized, and synoptic encyclopaedia, organized in accordance 
with an external schema, that one would typically associate with early modernity: 
if the contemporary encyclopaedia is structured like Leibniz’s system 
(minus, of course, harmonic pre-establishment), then it naturally follows 
that each of its regions is a complexion, complexity is its dominant 
concept, notions of the dictionary and translation are ceaselessly 
mobilized, and methodological pluralism straightaway emerges as a 
distribution of points of view across the system; finally, a philosophy of 
communication must inevitably be established that expresses the 
encyclopaedia and that is – given that it expresses the world such as it is, 
such as the sciences read it and institute it – a philosophy of 
communication without substance, i.e. without fixity or reference (HII: 
13). 
An encyclopaedia in constant movement, wherein knowledge continually overflows its 
conventional framing; an encyclopaedia traversed by invariants and isomorphisms, 
linking together regions that once seemed distant.  
All of which is to say, somewhat circuitously, that Serres’ early philosophy, in its 
articulation of an epistemology premised upon communication, transport, and 
circulation, speaks quite directly (albeit in a perhaps unfamiliar disciplinary language) 
to the concerns of contemporary media theory. Of course, Serres’ relevance has not 
been entirely misprized within this domain: for instance, some of his concepts have 
received sustained attention by German media theorists. 7  The Parasite (1982b), as 
elliptical as it often is, remains a central text for grasping the complications and 
limitations of the concept of noise as deployed by information theory and cybernetics.8 






But it seems unfortunate, in my estimation anyway, that the sophisticated system 
developed in the Hermes pentalogy has not been explored further within the sphere of 
media theory – even if Serres would later come to reject many of its claims (above all, 
its aspiration to a unitary model of science). 
One aspect that stands out in these five books is their apposite (and in many ways 
prescient) concern with developing an epistemological methodology appropriate to the 
overwhelming breadth, intrication, and interconnection of contemporary science, as 
well as human knowledge more generally. 9  Serres builds upon Bachelard’s ‘non-
Cartesian’ epistemology, which, like the sciences from which it draws its inspiration, 
‘tries to read the real complexity of things beneath the simple appearance’ and ‘seeks 
diversity beneath identity and tries to go beyond superficial and summary views’ (1984: 
139). But for the former, we need to go beyond this, accounting for an ever-growing 
and shifting field composed of manifold elements and links in constant interaction, a 
system wherein various sciences continually  converge and diverge in novel fashions, 
to the extent that one will never be able to totalize this field from a single perspective: 
‘crossed coordination, intersection, and application become essential aspects of 
Bachelardian complexity; they make an irreversible or linear order unthinkable’ (HII: 
65).  
In other words, the contemporary scientific encyclopaedia must be understood in 
topological terms, as a network: 
[f]or a given point, I can draw the connection node, the product, and the 
diagram of intersection: astrophysics is a region where parts taken from 
optics, electricity, thermodynamics, chemistry, and astronomy (none of 
which are simple regions) are thrown together. It refers to all these 
sciences, in the same way that the study of Lie groups refers to all of 
mathematics today. But in the same way that, in turn, each different 
science is a referred region, my local diagram is repeated everywhere, 
without me being able to draw the global diagram. I can move about from 
region to region, the configuration is stable, but I cannot reach the 
geometric of all configurations. I can travel in the labyrinth from crossroad 
to crossroad, from exchanger to exchanger, but I cannot figure the totality 
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of the route in a fixed plan. In the place of interreferences, I lack a global 
reference: it is essential that I be deprived of it (HII: 65). 
The non-hierarchical encyclopaedia is composed of interreferences and interferences. 
Singular, autochthonous regions, cut off from their neighbours, are gradually 
connected up, becoming ‘exchangers of concepts, methods, and models’ (HII: 65). 
The independence and autonomy of scientific fields of study is gradually attenuated, 
as their existence comes to depend more and more upon their myriad links with each 
other. Leibniz’s ars inveniendi is supplanted by an ars interveniendi, whereby scientific 
progress is achieved by circulation, translation, and correspondence between these 
increasingly mobile and permeable regions. ‘[I]ntersection is heuristic, and progress is 
interwoven’ (HII: 13). 
In the first chapter of the first volume of the Hermes pentalogy (Communication, 1968a), 
Serres begins by asking us to imagine a network diagram. He goes on to enumerate a 
number of affordances of such a diagram, as a means of methodological figuration, 
contrasted against the traditional dialectical form of argumentation. To very briefly 
summarize these affordances: a) whereas dialectical reasoning is unilinear, premised 
upon a univocal transmission of content through a single, simple channel, the network 
is ‘characterized by a plurality and complexity of the channels of mediation’ (HI: 12); 
b) instead of a univocal opposition between terms, one finds in the network a 
‘differentiation of types and quantities of determination’, allowing for a pluri-
determination of vertices (HI: 14); c) an equipotency cannot be posited between these 
various lines of determination, producing ‘a complicated and constantly changing set 
representing an unstable situation of power carefully distributing its arms or arguments 
in an irregularly-meshed space’ (HI: 15); d) the ‘pluralist differentiation and irregularity 
of the spatial distribution of vertices and paths allows us to conceive of (and 
experience) local and momentary associations of particular points and links’, cutting 
small, clearly defined, and well organized sub-totalities out of the network’s 
overarching totality (HI: 16); e) the network diagram figures spatio-temporal shifts, 
transformations, and variations at various scales, capturing a fluidity and mobility that 
eludes other methods of representation; and lastly, f) the plurality of connections from 
which the network’s vortices are formed allows for the apprehension of a retroaction 






or feedback completely incompatible with models of linear, irreversible causality – ‘the 
source and receiver are, simultaneously, effect and cause’ (HI: 20). 
Serres’ espousal of network topology thus sets the scene for his involved and evocative 
account of knowledge in an age of almost unfathomable complexity, one to which the 
simple oppositions and linear sequences of dialectical thinking cannot possibly remain 
adequate. But it also alludes to his work on Leibniz, in whose combinatorics he 
discerns a pivotal, if perhaps incipient account of the network form. In The System of 
Leibniz (1968b), his doctoral thesis, Serres uses this form as the basis for understanding 
Leibniz’s peculiar systematicity, the rigour of which is founded upon an arborescent 
and tabular mathematics freed from the limitations of the Spinozist more geometrico. 
Even though the Leibnizian system, devoid of any central, guiding text, scattered 
across a host of books, articles, letters, and notes, a great deal of which were not 
published in his lifetime, may well contain ‘hundreds and hundreds of different 
approaches for a concept or a being, an idea or a reality’ (1968b: 13), this does not 
threaten such rigour. 
By constructing network diagrams for both his philosophical notions and the 
mathematical model upon which he draws, Leibniz’s systematicity is brought into 
relief: 
[e]ach of these networks’ regions is figured by a kind of star node (a 
‘vertex’), each thread of which, efferent and/or afferent, crosses and joins 
all or part of all the other vertices. It becomes readily apparent that Leibniz 
has always taken great care to multiply these junctions and crossings, to 
link each point to all the others by many, if not all, possible paths: 
combination, composition, expression, and conspiracy. And his general 
idea of mathematics is analogous to his idea of the philosophical system: 
in both, all things consent, and the highest point of the sciences is, in his 
eyes, the theory of this consent (1968b: 14-15). 
Leibniz’s system involves ‘a variation of pluralities under the regulation of formal laws’ 
(1968b: 17), this formalism enabling both a conceptual multivalence whereby elements 
of the system can be integrated into various orders and filled with various kinds of 
semantic content, and a concomitant multilinearity whereby problems are dealt with 
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in a number of different, contrapuntal ways, traversing several regions at once. And in 
an isomorphous manner, Serres founds his unitary conception of the sciences upon 
the model of the mathematics of his time (e.g. set theory, topology, etc.), which he 
hopes will, thanks to its formal purity (i.e. its total lack of determinate content), allow 
him to avoid the accusation of still elevating a particular discipline to the status of a 
domineering queen-science. 10  Whereas classical mathematics is generally symbolic 
(such that signs correspond to specific meanings), modern mathematics is formal, and 
in such a formal system ‘one is not concerned at all with meaning, one never refers, 
either explicitly or implicitly, to significative content’ (HI: 31), the result being a 
multivalence that renders its concepts transportable across diverse domains. 
 
The formal and the empirical 
The network diagram is exemplary of Serres’ appeal to formalism, offering a structural 
representation of the formation and circulation of knowledge without claiming to 
impose any determinative content upon the regions that it surveys. Of course, said 
diagram does not, for us today, possess the same novelty that it probably did in the 
1960s: by virtue of ubiquitous computing, the network is an everyday concept, a cliché 
even, deployed in countless contexts without much in the way of critical reflection; it 
has also been normalized as a methodological figure within the social sciences (and 
particularly in fields such as science and technology studies), thanks above all to the 
remarkably widespread uptake of actor-network theory. ‘Those who follow networks, 
or study the sciences,’ declares Bruno Latour, the doyen of the latter theory, ‘are only 
documenting the nth loop in the spiral whose fabulous beginning Serres sketches for 
us’ (1993: 84). It is instructive, though, that by the mid-1990s, Latour (1996) finds 
himself having to clarify that the ‘network’ of actor-network theory has nothing to do 
with the technical sense of this word (e.g. sewage networks, train networks, subway 
networks, or telephone networks). The very fact that he has to distinguish this 
diagrammatic figure from its empirical correlates suggests that its formal purity is no 
longer self-evident, if it ever was. 
One of the guiding threads of Bachelard’s epistemology is the dialectical relationship 
between the rational and the real, which manifests in a corresponding relationship 
between formal structures and their empirical application: 






[s]cientific observation is always polemical; it either confirms or invalidates 
a prior thesis, a preexisting model, a plan for observation. It shows as it 
demonstrates; it establishes a hierarchy of appearances; it transcends the 
immediate; it reconstructs first its own models and then reality. And 
naturally, once the step is taken from observation to experimentation, the 
polemical character of knowledge stands out even more sharply. Now 
phenomena must be selected, filtered, purified, and cast in the mould of 
the instruments used; produced in accordance with their plan. And 
instruments are nothing but theories materialized. The phenomena they 
produce bear the stamp of theory throughout (1984: 12-13, translation 
altered). 
Empirical application casts a light upon the technical hindrances of any preconceived 
theoretical project, prompting new interpretations and formulations of this theory, 
which in turn acts as a spur to further experimentation. The consequence of which is 
‘that there is more to mathematics than formal structures, and that every pure idea is 
accompanied by an imagined application, an example that does duty for reality’ (1984: 
5), an observation that Serres builds upon in an especially productive manner.  
Despite appearances, Serres argues, there are no purely theoretical or experimental 
sciences, at least when viewed from a historical lens. Which might seem a slightly 
surprising claim, given what has already been said about his appeals to the formal purity 
of modern mathematics. ‘The history of mathematics,’ he clarifies, ‘adequately 
demonstrates that purity is only relative: a horizon’ (HII: 50). At any given moment, 
the latest developments in mathematical thinking (as well as theoretical physics) will 
likely to seem to possess a refinement – a general applicability – surpassing that of any 
prior theory. This generality is not an absolute state though, but a single stage in an 
ongoing process of generalization of its objects and methods, one that makes all prior 
theories seem like special cases or specific instances. Thus, as he explains in a passage 
from the second Hermes volume (Interference, 1972) worth quoting at length, this 
continual purification actually allows one to recover the residua that are left behind:   
mathematical science is not pure, in itself and by divine right; rather, it 
moves toward purity. Then, turning around, the mathematician perceives 
previous theories as being applied theories. The antecedent, on the basis 
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of history, is perceived, after the fact, as applied, on the basis of purity (in 
general, de facto history turns into de jure history). Hence, Euclidean space 
appears to us as the space of masons and architects. This is obviously not 
the space that the Greek mathematicians really had in mind, but that which 
has been retrospectively recovered by our contemporaries: the former 
contained a de facto purity that the latter removed from it in order to 
constitute the de jure rule. And the sediment left by the progress which 
sweeps away purity is this Euclidean, quasi-technological geometry. 
Epistemological truth requires this historical truth. The same is true of 
‘perspectival’ space, which can only appear to us as that of painters and 
stonemasons. Movement is therefore essential in judging purity and 
judging application: the passage toward an increasingly refined and 
transparent purity brings the preceding stage back to its technical state. It 
is thus impossible to judge these spaces in the same way that the Greeks 
or geometers of past centuries would have: a judgement of purity is, as it 
develops, eventually (and necessarily) transformed into a judgement of 
application (HII: 50-51). 
The epistemologist witnesses a complex, historical movement whereby mathematics’ 
progression toward an ever-increasing formal purity repeatedly and reciprocally 
uncovers its singular and applied (i.e. empirical, technical, pragmatic, etc.) origin. The 
more formal it seems in its present state, the more its preceding states seem 
correlatively naïve, worldly, and even unmathematical.11 
Latour’s need to warn that his usage of the term network must not be conflated with 
its various empirical applications might suggest to us that this concept has well and 
truly lost its appearance of formal purity. In the same way that information theory – 
which, for Serres, possesses a multivalence that has allowed it to be imported into 
many different disciplines, in line with its universalist pretensions – is likely to seem to 
us today as singularly and rather blatantly wedded to the problems of 
telecommunications and electrical engineering from which it arose, no longer able to 
be posited as a general theory of communication, the image of the network, as 
ubiquitous as it is, is likely to evoke particular empirical instances (which these days 
might include financial networks, trade networks, broadcast networks, computer 






networks at varying scales of distribution, social networking sites, or even the 
increasingly common parlance of ‘networking’ as a social activity) that immediately call 
its abstraction into question. 
In fact, from a media theoretical perspective, one might now even view this abstraction 
or formalization as obscuring something fundamental about the ways in which this 
concept is deployed. One could point, for example, toward Tiziana Terranova’s still-
prescient observation that the model of network power operative in the internet 
involves ‘as a dimension of its openness not only a benevolent welcoming of 
differences but also a more general drive towards expansion’ (2004: 62), a neo-
imperialist technocultural impulse. One could argue, following Wendy Chun, that 
‘[a]lthough they enable individuals to cognitively map their relation to others, networks 
also confuse and obfuscate’, grounded as they are upon the assumption that 
‘everything can be reduced to nodes and edges’ (2016: 39-40). Over time, the network 
diagram’s purported generality becomes a reminder of the messy materiality – the noise 
– from which it is abstracted. A model designed to represent complexity comes to 
seem unduly simplistic. Or one could note, as Tung Hui-Hu does, that ‘the network is 
always more than its digital or physical infrastructure’, for it chiefly comprises ‘the idea 
that “everything is connected,” and, as such, is a product of a system of belief’ (2015: 
10). 
Use of the network concept and form is more prevalent now than ever – including 
within the everyday vernacular, far removed from its provenance in mathematics and 
engineering. But this ubiquity helps highlight its inadequacies as a mode of figuration. 
In any case, the universalism for which Serres advocates in regard to network topology, 
information theory, set theory, or any of his other privileged formalisms – a 
universalism based upon formal purity and generality – will probably strike the reader 
today as somewhat implausible, not only because of the preponderate distaste for such 
sweeping claims in contemporary scholarship, but because these models simply no 
longer give the impression of being as pure or as general as they once did.12 But of 
course, Serres himself would no doubt recognize this. His universalism, such as it is 
posited, is only ever provisional, precisely for the reason that the formalism of any 
model will decay over time, as the forward march of mathematical purification 
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continues unabated. A rigorous epistemology, immanent to the scientific method and 
its discoveries, requires this provisionality.  
Making one’s way sequentially through the five Hermes volumes (published over the 
course of twelve years), it becomes obvious that Serres himself was quickly becoming 
dissatisfied with the models upon which he had initially relied. In the third volume 
(Translation, 1974), he still views network topology as an ideal means of representation 
for a ‘marvellous age of genealogical pluralism, where the generation of words and 
discourses, beings and things, issuing from anywhere, spreads without constraint’ 
(HIII: 27). By the time of the final two (Distribution, 1977 and The Northwest Passage, 
1980, respectively), however, he is far more sceptical regarding its epistemological 
adequacy. To return to the things themselves, he avers, means ‘taking them as they are, 
no longer linking them together in linear sequences or multiple planes woven into a 
network, but dealing with them directly as large numbers, large populations, clouds’ 
(HIV: 40, my emphasis). It means treating the interweaving of the network (not to 
mention the rigid structures of the grid or tree diagram) as the exception, rather than 
a totalizing rule. It means understanding that ‘[a]ll our partitions and all our divisions, 
our differences, chains, series; sequences, consequences, systems, orders, and 
formations, hierarchies and archés’ (HIV: 40) are the arbitrary products of deliberate 
choices, which are in turn fundamentally acts of power. And ultimately, it means mixing, 
melting, and dissolving these structures, ‘returning to the things themselves all their 
rights prior to our intervening’ (HIV: 40). He appeals to a dispersive distribution that 
precedes combinatorics, sets, orders, signals, and any other kind of structuration or 
definition. Not the distribution of specific messages, but the noise from which all such 
messages contingently arise.13 
The aforementioned figure of the cloud becomes one of his preferred images for 
evoking a ‘chaos, disorder, and background noise the complexity of which far exceeds 
the competence of established networks’ (HV: 64), the indistinct borders of which 
stand in contrast to the smooth, distinct lines of the traditional encyclopaedia. Whereas 
the Hermes pentalogy begins by outlining a structural method premised upon formal 
models and heuristics, by the end it is the residua which inevitably elude such 
formalization that are not only treated as the central focus of its study, but are elevated 
to a status of ontological primacy. The real, we discover pace Hegel, is not rational; it is 






disorder. The rational is a blip, an anomaly, a ‘precise, exact, clear-cut, rigorous, acute, 
distinct island’ (HIV: 11) that momentarily appears within an indifferentiable ocean. 
Epistemology must turn its attention toward fluctuation, turbulence, noise, stochastic 
processes, fuzzy sets, and so on and so forth. ‘Our networks are locally immersed in 
clouds, our structures in distributions, like archipelagos in the sea’ (HV: 64).  
This gesture toward a tumultuous, protean reality, unable to be squished into the 
moulds of representational thought, brings Serres into contact, somewhat surprisingly 
(by his own admission) with the metaphysical psychology of Henri Bergson, of whom 
the former is frequently derisive. In media theory we are all likely familiar with such 
gestures, thanks to the growing preponderance of Bergsonian and Deleuzian 
approaches within this sphere – even if their methods and protocols are often quite 
different to those which Serres elaborates. Hence it is not his move away from 
formalism per se that interests me here; rather, it is the way in which this move can be 
considered part and parcel of an epistemological system that stresses the need to ‘open 
a new epistemological spectrum and discern those colours that our prejudices effaced’ 
(HIII: 31) – which is to say, to be continually revised both in light of new discoveries 
and paradigms and in recognition of its own previously undiscerned flaws and 
limitations.  
The question of complexity, and how we grapple with it, must henceforth be central 
to any rigorous account of media and mediation. The object of study – our 
contemporary media environment, in all of its multiscalar intricacy, unfathomable 
density, and unavoidable entanglement with our lifeworld – demands such an 
approach.14 We need a media theory adequate to this complexity (or which, more 
realistically, at least aims toward such adequation), and this in turn means a media 
theory that interrogates its own theorization, reflecting upon the ways in which it is 
itself tied up with this complexity – for instance, the ways in which it traverses and 
intersects with other fields of study, producing an involuted and mutable meshwork 
of concepts and methods.15  This discipline is no stranger to celebratory calls for 
theoretical eclecticism or ecumenicalism, but if we are going to be more than just 
intellectual bowerbirds, collecting bright and shiny concepts for display, we need to 
pay more attention to the reciprocally determined feedback loop between theory and 
its object. In short, we need to reflect upon the variegated ways in which media theory 
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is mediated by the media of which it speaks and vice versa, with all the inevitable 
recursion and circularity that this implies. 
 
Conclusion 
‘Media theory,’ observe Scott Wark and McKenzie Wark, is today ‘mediated by the 
platform, which presents us with readymade conceptualizations that we uncritically 
incorporate into our theories’ (2019: 310). This is one of the hurdles such theory 
constantly encounters: we unceasingly utilize the media technologies that we purport 
to analyse, our quotidian experience is saturated by them, with the consequence that 
even the most sceptical critics are likely to be at least somewhat drawn into their logics 
and discourses, shaped by their affordances. It is impossible to extricate the act of 
theorization from its material (and technical), intellectual, and institutional conditions 
– and these include not only the media under examination, but also those used for 
research, writing, dissemination, promotion, and so on. This is the hurdle Plato 
confronted in the Phaedrus, two and a half millennia ago, and it still persists, in a greatly 
intensified form, today.16 Instead of just tritely signalling adherence to the standard 
scholarly conventions of self-reflexivity, media studies may need to engage 
conscientiously with the classically philosophical problem of the condition and the 
conditioned in regard to its own practice, and the recursive relationships therein. 
Serres’ work alone is not sufficient for this task, but it certainly offers significant 
resources to help us along the way. 
It goes without saying that media theory does not bear a great deal of resemblance to 
the sciences with which Serres principally concerns himself in the Hermes books: it 
makes little claim to formal purity; it does not in any way follow the scientific method; 
and it does not evince the kind of historical ‘progress’, however aleatory, that Serres 
views as central to such sciences, even if it does obviously demonstrate a historical 
progression (in the non-teleological sense of the word). Indeed, much of the ‘progress’ 
media theory makes, if we can still refer to such a thing, is mostly down to the rapid 
pace of technological development, and the new devices, platforms, and forms of 
content unremittingly introduced – an uneasy relationship, if there ever were one. 
By the same token though, one of the virtues of media theory is that it tends to at least 
tacitly recognize the extent to which its concepts are empirically, materially, and 






technically conditioned (i.e. mediated). This fact is hard to avoid, since media 
theoretical concepts are typically tied to the media in response to which they have 
arisen. In many cases, a patina of formal ideality develops over time, lending them a 
multivalence that allows them to be applied to new objects, but their original surface 
usually remains visible underneath, manifesting as a kind of awkward discrepancy in 
relation to the new contexts and concerns in which they are placed. It is important that 
we ensure that, at a time when media and communications studies are being 
increasingly drawn toward scientistic qualitative and quantitative methods of research 
– which do, in many cases, aspire to a certain formalism – that we do not occlude this 
empirical residuum. Serres’ Hermes pentalogy supplies a powerful, if enigmatic, 
corrective to uncritical positivism in its many guises, reminding us of the need to 
maintain reflexivity and embrace recursion in the face of a sometimes seemingly 
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1 The question of what exactly comprises ‘theory’ is fraught and contentious. For expediency’s sake, I 
will cite Simon During’s (2010: 95-96) description of ‘a discrete formation inside the humanities after 
about 1970’ which ‘produces a body of very loosely connected concepts with varying genealogies and 
implications (if still connected to the European philosophic tradition) that constitute a residual, 
unrecognized-as-such “theory corpus” not always able to be tied to particular proper names’. 
2 Although Serres is lucky to have had a quite substantial portion of his oeuvre translated, this sadly 
does not extend to the five Hermes books, wherefrom only a small selection of essays are available in 
English, primarily as part of the Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy (1982a) collection, which also 
contains a conspicuously lucid introduction to the main themes of his work. Other excellent secondary 
texts include Maria Assad’s Reading with Michel Serres (1999) and Christopher Watkin’s recent Michel 
Serres: Figures of Thought (2020). 
3 In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, in this article I consistently use the term ‘epistemology’ in 
the French sense, i.e. the philosophy of science and scientific knowledge (comprising thinkers such as 
Poincaré, Bachelard, Koyré, Cavaillès, and Canguilhem, amongst many others), rather than in the 
English sense of a branch of philosophy dealing with knowledge in general (which is typically referred 
to, in French, as ‘la théorie de la connaissance’). 
4 On Serres’ neo-Leibnizian take on epistemology, see Mercier (2015; 2019b). 
5 All translations of Serres are my own, unless otherwise noted. The five volumes that constitute the 
Hermes pentalogy are cited in this article as HI, HII, HIII, HIV, and HV respectively. 
6 Cf. Bachelard, The Philosophy of No (1968). 
7 In terms of material accessible in English, see for example: Siegert (2015) on cacography; Engell (2013) 
on tactility; and Sybille Krämer (2015 [2008]) on communication, translation, and exchange.  
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8 For an especially clear exposition of this aspect of Serres’ work, and its relevance to questions of noise 
more broadly, see Thompson (2017: 56-62). On noise with respect to philosophical communication 
specifically, see also Sutherland (2021). 
9 Serres ‘is extremely important,’ suggests Stephen Kennedy, ‘in terms of supporting models of thought 
capable of accounting for the current complex nature of our existence where the fuzziness of 
uncertainty and anxiety are recurring features’ (2021: 112). 
10 See Bühlmann (2020) in regard to Serres’ recourse to mathematics and information theory. 
11 On Serres’ consideration of mathematics and history, see Mercier (2019a). 
12 More recently, Alain Badiou has espoused his own ontological universalism grounded in set theory. 
Justin Clemens and Adam Nash (2015: 19) extol Badiou’s ‘exceptional, ingenious propositions and 
arguments’ concerning set theory; I, however, remain obstinately unfamiliar with the former’s work, 
so I’ll just have to take their word for it… 
13  N. Katherine Hayles proffers a helpful exploration of Serres’ ‘divided loyalties’, whereby he is 
‘attracted by the promise of universal laws that hold true regardless of local circumstance’ and at the 
same time ‘delights in the refractory resistances of local sites that prevent their assimilation into global 
theories’ (1988: 4-5). 
14 Marjorie Perloff is perhaps even understating things when she remarks that ‘there can be no doubt 
that the technological environment of the present time from radio and TV, to cellular phones, to the 
new Internet technologies, creates a level of noise undreamed of even a few decades ago ’(2005: 103). 
15 ‘For a media theory inspired by Serres,’ writes Timothy Barker, ‘it is the flow of information across a 
diversity of media channels that is the topic of philosophical inquiry and it is the codes that condition 
this flow that come in for critical scrutiny’ (2015: 53). Such scrutiny, however, must also be cast upon 
the determinative effect this transport has upon media theory itself. 
16 ‘When [Plato] turns against poetry,’ notes Eric Havelock, ‘it is precisely its dynamism, its fluidity, its 
concreteness, its particularity, that he deplores. He could not have reached the point of deploring it if 
he had not become literate himself’ (1986: 96). 
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